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The 2011 decision on jurisdiction and admissibility 
in Abaclat and Others v Argentina has started a 
discussion about mass claims processes in investment 
treaty arbitration. The tribunal concluded that 
although proceedings were initiated in aggregate, the 
continuance of the case contained a representative 
feature. This determination led them to declare that 
the applicable procedure could and had to be adapted. 
Today, the legacy of Abaclat and the availability of 
mass claims procedural devices in investment treaty 
arbitration remain questionable: can mass claims 
investment arbitration be qualified as ‘class-like’? If so, 
does it satisfy the fundamental principles of arbitration 
(particularly the principle of consent)? This article 
takes a comparative approach to answering these 
questions by putting mass claims investment arbitration 
procedures and United States class actions processes 
side-by-side. It argues that mass claims arbitration 
as construed in Abaclat cannot satisfy fundamental 
arbitration principles because it fails to observe 
the inextricable link between the parties’ consent, 
representative procedure, and representative relief. It 
is therefore wrong to view mass claims arbitration as 
an available device for investors in investment treaty 
arbitration.
La décision de 2011 dans Abaclat et autres c. Argentine 
concernant la juridiction et l’admissibilité a initié une 
discussion sur les processus de réclamations collectives 
en arbitrage relatif aux traités d’investissement. Le 
tribunal a conclu que malgré que la procédure ait 
débutée en jonction, la continuation du cas contenait 
une caractéristique représentative. Ceci a mené 
le tribunal à déclarer que la procédure applicable 
pouvait, et devait, être adaptée. Aujourd’hui, 
l’héritage d’Abaclat, et la disponibilité des dispositifs 
procéduraux des réclamations collectives en arbitrage 
relatif aux traités d’investissement demeurent douteux: 
est-ce que les réclamations collectives en arbitrage 
d’investissement peuvent être qualifiées comme 
étant «collectives»? Le cas échéant, est ce qu’ils 
satisfont aux principes fondamentaux de l’arbitrage 
(particulièrement le principe de consentement)? Cet 
article adopte une approche comparative afin de 
répondre à ces questions en mettant la procédure des 
réclamations collectives en arbitrage d’investissement 
et la procédure des recours collectifs des États-Unis 
côte à côte. L’article avance que l’arbitrage des 
réclamations collectives, tel que conçu dans Abaclat, 
ne peut satisfaire aux principes fondamentaux de 
l’arbitrage, ne respectant pas le lien inextricable entre 
le consentement, la procédure représentative et la 
décision représentatif. Il est donc faux de considérer 
l’arbitrage des réclamations collectives comme 
étant un moyen disponible pour les investisseurs en 
arbitrage relatif aux traités d’investissements. 
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I. Introduction
The idea of mass claims in investment treaty arbitration appeared in a 2011 decision in 
the case of Abaclat and Others v the Argentine Republic.1 A tribunal found that it had jurisdiction 
to hear claims of some 60,000 claimants contesting aspects of Argentina’s sovereign bond 
restructuring programme. These proceedings occurred under the auspices of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’)2 and its Arbitration Rules (‘ICSID-AR’).3 
Without special rules provided within that framework regulating large-scale arbitrations, the 
tribunal developed a new form of large-scale arbitration called ‘mass claims proceedings’.4 The 
tribunal explained that the distinct name for the new process merely reflected the massive number 
of the claimants.5 However, it also made reference to its ‘hybrid nature’: the proceedings started 
as aggregate—initiated by a number of individually identified claims—but the continuance of the 
case purportedly contained a representative character.6 This feature had a direct and important 
effect. Because of the large number of the claimants, the tribunal had to fill the ‘gap’ in procedure 
to adapt for collective proceedings.7 After finding it had jurisdiction in abstracto, it created a 
special procedure for ruling on jurisdiction over individual claims,8 and issued a number of orders 
with that aim.9 
The legacy of this case after its settlement in 2016,10 and particularly the availability of mass 
claims devices in investment treaty arbitration, remain unclear. Whether mass claims investment 
arbitration is similar to class arbitration or can at least be associated with the representative (class) 
action processes generally is questionable. The first thing that crosses one’s mind is the massive 
contextual difference between class processes and dispute settlement tools in international law.11 
1 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (4 August 2011), ICSID, Case No 
ARB/07/5 [Abaclat Decision].
2 ICSID was established by virtue of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID 
Convention]. The ICSID Convention also provides the basic procedural rules applicable in arbitral proceedings, 
while besides that Convention, ICSID tribunals apply the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which contain detailed 
procedural rules.
3 ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) (effective 10 April 2006), online: 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf> [ICSID-AR].
4 See also SI Strong, Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) at 16-17 [Strong, Class].
5 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 480.
6 Ibid at para 488. See in more detail Part II, Section A below.
7 See Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 551.
8 See in more detail Part IV, Section B, Subsection 2.
9 34 procedural orders are publicly available online, for this issue most important being orders Nos 12, 15 and 17, 
rendered in the course of 2012 and 2013.
10 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, Consent Award Under ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(2) (29 December 2016), 
ICSID, Case No ARB/07/5. The Consent Award includes the Settlement Agreement as Annex A, and it notes at 
para pp that “both the Settlement Agreement and the Consent Award and their terms and provisions are made and 
agreed without any admission by the Parties of ICSID jurisdiction and international liability […]”. As explained 
by Arbitrator Santiago Torres Bernárdez, this reservation means that the Settlement Agreement “is based upon 
considerations alien to the law applicable to the dispute as instituted”; see Abaclat and Others v Argentina, 
Declaration Appended to the Award by Arbitrator Santiago Torres Bernárdez (15 December 2016), ICSID, Case 
No ARB/07/5 at para 7 [Declaration by Santiago Torres Bernárdez].
11 It should be noted that the tribunal attempted to overcome the peculiarities of different collective proceedings by 
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Domestic class actions are “a procedural device allowing plaintiffs to sue not only for injury 
done to themselves but on behalf of other persons similarly situated for injury done to them”.12 A 
single party representing an entire class can bind those members of a class who are not involved 
in the process, which was not the case in Abaclat.13 Class arbitrations also operate under a specific 
procedural system which makes their transposition onto the international stage difficult.14 
What results from the hybrid process outlined in Abaclat then? Can mass claims investment 
arbitration be considered ‘class-like’? If so, would the process still satisfy fundamental principles 
of arbitration like consent? This article takes a comparative approach to answering these questions. 
It examines characteristics of mass claims investment arbitration, on one hand, and class action 
processes in the US on the other. Part two identifies the key features of mass claims arbitration 
by examining how it was set out in the Abaclat decision and two subsequent awards rendered 
under the same ICSID regime. Part three discusses class action regimes in US domestic law, 
looking at traditional class litigation as well as arbitration. It argues that all class action processes 
inextricably link the consent of the parties, representative procedure, and representative relief. 
Part four critically assesses mass claims investment arbitration, paying special attention to its 
functioning as a class-like arbitration. Part five concludes.
Based on the analysis, it is argued that mass claims arbitration proceedings as outlined 
in Abaclat are fundamentally flawed. First, unlike domestic class action processes, mass claims 
investment arbitration lacks a proper basis in law dictating the rules that govern such processes. 
The special procedure for conducting mass claims arbitration is not consented to by the parties. 
Second, while domestic class action regimes provide special mechanisms for awarding relief, 
mass claims investment arbitration aims to do so in a manner usually not available to investment 
tribunals. The Abaclat tribunal conceived mass claims arbitration as being able to introduce a 
form of a representative relief in investment arbitration, failing to observe its connection to the 
applicable procedure and to respect party consent. The decision did not strengthen the case for 
mass claims in investment treaty arbitration. To the contrary, mass claims arbitration is still not an 
available device for investors in this field.
II.  Abaclat and	Mass	Claims	Arbitration
Part two puts forward the key findings in Abaclat and two related arbitrations (Section A) 
with the aim of sketching the basic features of a mass claims investment arbitration (Section B).
pointing to their “common ‘raison d’être’”, which is the necessity of ensuring an effective remedy “where the 
absence of such mechanism would de facto have resulted in depriving the claimants of their substantive rights due 
to the lack of appropriate mechanism”. Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 484.
12 Bernard Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-Issue and Class Actions (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 260 [Hanotiau].
13 This difference has radical implications on individualized determinations: Donald Francis Donovan, “Abaclat 
and others v Argentine Republic As a Collective Claims Proceeding” (2012) 27 ICSID Rev-FILJ 261 at 263.
14 Berk Demirkol, “Does an Investment Treaty Tribunal Need Special Consent for Mass Claims?” (2013) 2 Cambridge 
J Int’l and Comp L 612 at 624 [Demirkol]. For particulars of the US system allowing class arbitration see Part 
III. For an argument aiming at overcoming the differences among specific regimes and finding the legitimacy of 
mass claims actions in investment law by characterising them as a form of regulatory arbitration see SI Strong, 
“Mass Procedures as a Form of ‘Regulatory Arbitration’—Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International 
Investment Regime” (2013) 38 J Corp L 259.
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A. A New Phenomenon Appears: Abaclat and Two Subsequent Awards
In 2011, the Abaclat tribunal ruled that some 60,000 claimants could join their claims 
in a single arbitration involving Argentina and its sovereign debt restructuring programme. It 
labelled its new creation a ‘mass claims proceeding’.15 There were two approaches available in 
characterizing the claims: as aggregate claims, meaning grouping individual claimants into a 
single process, or as representative or class actions, meaning a single claim be brought on behalf 
of an entire class of absent members. The tribunal compromised, qualifying the proceeding as a 
hybrid. It reasoned that although the claims before it were brought as aggregate, the continuance 
of the case resembled a representative process.16 Representativeness was purportedly caused by 
the large number of claimants and because the third party representing them collectively could not 
account for the interests of claimants individually.17 
The hybrid character of the proceedings forced the tribunal to adapt procedure in order 
to make the case manageable.18 Two groups of adaptations were identified: those concerning 
the examination of the claims and those concerning the representation of the claimants.19 The 
former required the simplified verification of evidentiary material.20 The tribunal also created and 
applied a unique method of examining the claims for the purpose of final ruling on jurisdiction 
and admissibility.21
Similar subsequent cases distanced themselves in their approach. In Ambiente Ufficio and 
Others v the Argentine Republic, a tribunal held that the large-scale case before it should not be 
treated any differently from simple multi-party proceedings.22 The same approach was taken in 
Alemanni and Others v the Argentine Republic.23 The distinguishing factor in the latter two cases 
was scale: while Abaclat involved some 60,000 claimants, the Ambiente and Alemanni cases each 
involved about 100. It is thus understandable that the Ambiente tribunal relied on this explicitly to 
distinguish the case before it from Abaclat in taking a multi-party approach.24 And so, the Abaclat 
decision still stands alone in qualifying an arbitration process as one of mass claims. The findings 
on jurisdiction, admissibility, and tribunal powers in that case are therefore most significant. 
15 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 294.
16 Ibid at para 488.
17 Ibid at paras 486-488. See also SI Strong, “Mass procedures in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic – are they consistent 
with the international investment regime?” (2013) 3 Yrbk Int’l Arb 261 at 265-269 [Strong, “Mass procedures in 
Abaclat”]. As noted above, the tribunal took note of “a common ‘raison d‘être’” of different collective proceedings, 
attempting to overcome the differences between aggregate and class proceedings. See note 11 above.
18 See Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at paras 515-551. The adaptations of the procedural rules, and the tribunal’s 
power to conduct such changes in general, are of a particular significance for the issues of special consent; see Part 
IV, Section A.
19 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 530.
20 Ibid at para 531.
21 See Part IV, Section B, Subsection 2.
22 Ambiente Ufficio SPA and Others v the Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (8 February 
2013), ICSID, Case No ARB/08/9 at para 122 [Ambiente].
23 Giovanni Alemanni and Others v the Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 November 
2014), ICSID, Case No ARB/07/8 at paras 267 ff [Alemanni]. 
24 Ambiente, supra note 22 at paras 120 and 135.
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Abaclat and the two subsequent awards are distinguished by their procedural findings: 
while the former concluded there was a need for adaptations, the Ambiente and Alemanni 
tribunals considered such adaptations unnecessary because they stemmed from the mass claim 
characterization.25 The distinction appears to make it clear that mass claims arbitration contains two 
important and interrelated features: the causal implications of a large number of the claimants and 
a consequential need for procedural adaptations. If the mere plurality of claimants were definitive, 
mass claims proceedings remain multi-party processes. However, procedural adaptations were 
also deemed necessary, an important distinguishing factor was thus present and raised problems 
with consent.
Arbitration is generally consensual by nature.26 This remains true in the investment dispute 
context.27 Due to a unique method of expression of consent in investment arbitration, usually through 
a bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’),28 State consent to arbitration bears a particular significance.29 
All aspects of the arbitral proceedings must be agreed to by the parties, and therefore any deviation 
from the original agreement must be validated by fresh consent.30 The Ambiente and Alemanni 
tribunals determined that proceedings before them were multi-party and that accordingly, lacking 
the need for a change, there was no requirement of special State consent.31 Such a requirement 
appears, however, when a change is necessary.
Scholars have suggested that the Abaclat tribunal made an error by treating the case 
differently from a multi-party proceeding.32 These arguments emphasize that State consent is a 
standing offer not limited to a particular number of claimants. Indeed, offers to arbitrate in BITs are 
addressed to a plurality of investors by default—all potential claimants.33 The only new element 
in Abaclat, it is argued, was to respond to the claims altogether instead of conducting multiple 
individual proceedings.34 Another argument observes that there was no need for a special consent 
25 Ibid at paras 120 and 169; Alemanni, supra note 23 para 324. 
26 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 71 
[Steingruber, Consent].
27 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (18 March 1965) Doc 
ICSID/2 at para 23, online: <http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB-section05.
htm#02>.
28 A State offers consent to arbitration through its national legislation, or in international investment agreements with 
other States, which is later perfected into an arbitration agreement upon an acceptance by an investor. See Rudolf 
Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 254 ff.
29 Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
at 151.
30 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 522 (commenting that a modification of existing rules can only be effected 
subject to the parties’ agreement).
31 Ambiente, supra note 22 at para 141; Alemanni, supra note 23 at para 269.
32 Hans van Houtte & Bridie McAsey, “Abaclat and others v Argentine Republic ICSID, the BIT and Mass Claims” 
(2012) 27 ICSID Rev-FILJ 231 at 234-235; Demirkol, supra note 14 at 631.
33 Andrea Marco Steingruber, “Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic Consent in Large-scale Arbitration 
Proceedings” (2012) 27 ICSID Rev-FILJ 237 at 241.
34 Strong, “Mass procedures in Abaclat”, supra note 17 at 280-281.
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by the respondent State in the Abaclat case because the proceedings were initiated by a plurality of 
claimants without a subsequent change in the proceedings (such as the consolidation of cases).35 
While these arguments work if plurality is the only feature of mass claims arbitration, that is not 
the case. Expressly or implicitly, all three cases referred to above observe two features in mass 
claims investment arbitration: causality, and the consequential need for procedural adaptations. 
Only the latter raises concerns for a special State consent. Part four analyses these concerns in 
detail.
III. Class	Actions	in	the	United	States	
Section A analyses procedural aspects of US class actions while section B examines their 
relation to the need for a secondary consent. It is argued that any class action process, be it litigation 
or arbitration, inextricably links the disputing parties’ consent to the representative procedure.  A. Class Action Processes: the Basics
Class action proceedings in the US take two forms: litigation and arbitration. The former 
has a well-established legal basis. The latter was formed in practice, and is still subject to various 
debates. Class litigation rules are outlined in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(‘FRCP’).36 It lays out certification and issuance procedures that give individuals an opportunity 
to participate in or request exclusion from proceedings.37 Under its original incarnation in 1938, 
class actions functioned via an opt-in mechanism: if members of a class wanted to be bound by a 
decision of the court on their common issues of law or facts, they had to opt in to litigation.38 In 
1966 this changed to an opt-out mechanism: members of a class that did not want to be bound by 
a decision now had to express this desire.39 The change was intended to increase the efficiency 
of the class litigation system by shifting the burden to take action to class members if they were 
unwilling to be bound by an outcome.40 Today, the regime remains largely the same. 
35 Demirkol, supra note 14 at 629-631.
36 Fed R Civ P (US), rule 23(b) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting 
separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying 
adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical 
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; (2) the party opposing the class has 
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and 
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 
The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 
the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action” [emphasis added]). 
37 Rule 23(c)(2) provides that a court may direct a notice to class members in cases of class actions (b)(1) and (b)(2), 
while when a court is seized of a (b)(3) class action, a notice must be issued.
38 See Deborah R Hensler et al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain (Santa Monica: 
Rand, 2000) at 11 ff (naming three types of class actions under the 1938 FRCP: true, spurious and hybrid) 
[Hensler].
39 Ibid at 12-14.
40 The new mechanism, however, in some instances is considered inappropriate. For arguments in favour of switching 
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Class arbitration has a much more complex history. As a class dispute resolution 
mechanism, it emerged in the US during the 1980s when some state courts began to order class 
arbitrations where there were a large number of similarly-situated claimants against the same 
defendant, having identical arbitration agreements.41 The practice was not unanimously approved 
of, as Champ v Siegel demonstrated when a federal court refused to order class arbitration without 
a specific agreement of the parties.42 However, early notable court rulings showed their support. 
In Green Tree Financial Corp v Bazzle, the United States Supreme Court (‘USSC’) held that 
arbitrators were supposed to determine if class arbitration was contractually permitted.43 In a 
subsequent decision, the Supreme Court of California (‘CSC’) ruled in Discover Bank v Superior 
Court of Los Angeles that even explicit contractual clauses (i.e. class action waivers) obliging the 
parties not to pursue class action processes were unenforceable under state law in so far as they 
left the weaker party effectively without remedy.44 The two rulings led many US courts to compel 
class arbitrations, holding that class action waivers were unconscionable.45 
In 2010 the USSC switched directions and adopted a stricter approach. In Stolt-Nielsen 
SA v AnimalFeeds International Corp, the court took the view that silent arbitration clauses did 
not allow for class arbitration.46 The request in the case was to vacate an arbitral award where 
the arbitration clause in question was first interpreted as permitting class arbitration. The USSC 
supported the vacatur, concluding that the arbitration panel imposed its own policy view of class 
arbitration.47 When faced with the interpretation of a ‘silent’ arbitral agreement, the court considered 
the tribunal’s task as determining if any legal rule governed the situation. The tribunal failed to 
do so, they concluded, proceeding instead as if it had the authority to develop its own view of the 
back to the opt-in mechanism see ibid at 476-477.
41 Gary Born & Claudio Salas, “The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors” 
(2012) 2012 J Disp Res 21 at 21-22 [Born & Salas].
42 Ibid at 27.
43 Green Tree Financial Corp nka Conseco Finance Corp v Bazzle et al (2003) 539 US 444 at 451-453 [Bazzle]. 
This was only a plurality opinion joined by one additional judge. The case before the USSC stemmed from two 
cases which were later joined. The arbitrator in the first one (who was subsequently named arbitrator in the second 
case as well), reached the decision that class arbitration was permitted under the arbitration agreements at stake, 
and he did so after a trial court ordered class arbitration based on the identical arbitration agreements applicable 
in the second case. The USSC acknowledged that the arbitrator probably affirmed the reasoning of the trial court 
(ibid at 453-454). But see Opalinski v Robert Half Int’l, 2017 WL 395968, 3d Cir; Dell Web Communities Inc 
v Carlson, 2016 WL 1178829, 4th Cir; Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v Scout Petroleum LLC, 2016 WL 53860, 
3d Cir; Opalinski v Robert Half Int’l, 2014 WL 3733685, 3d Cir; and Reed Elsevier Inc v Crockett, 2013 WL 
5911219, 6th Cir (holding that the issue of the availability of class arbitration should be decided by courts).
44 Discover Bank v Superior Court of Los Angeles (2005) 30 Cal Rptr 3d 76. The CSC concluded that “at least 
under some circumstances, the law in California is that class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion 
are unenforceable, whether the consumer is being asked to waive the right to class action litigation or the right to 
classwide arbitration”, and that the FAA did not pre-empt California law in this respect (ibid at 79). In reaching 
its conclusions the CSC used the doctrine of unconscionability and stated that class action waivers in adhesion 
contracts might be “substantively unconscionable inasmuch as they may operate effectively as exculpatory 
contract clauses that are contrary to public policy” (ibid at 85). It held that “one-sided, exculpatory contracts in a 
contract of adhesion, at least to the extent they operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be 
imposed under California law, are generally unconscionable” (ibid at 85-86). 
45 Born & Salas, supra note 41 at 33.
46 Stolt-Nielsen SA et al v AnimalFeeds International Corp (2010) 559 US 662 [Stolt-Nielsen].
47 Ibid at 7.
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appropriate rule to be applied. It should have instead looked to whether there was a ‘default rule’ 
in governing law whereby arbitration clauses could be construed as allowing class arbitration in 
the absence of express consent.48 Instead, the tribunal relied solely to a “post-Bazzle consensus” 
that class arbitration was beneficial in “a wide variety of settings”.49 The court concluded on 
contractual principles that a party could not be compelled to submit to class arbitration under the 
FAA unless there was “a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”.50 The 
finding of no intention to preclude class arbitration was in discord with the foundational principle 
entrenched in the FAA that arbitration is a matter of consent.51 Class formation changed the nature 
of proceedings to such a degree that it could not be presumed to have been consented to because 
of the mere presence of arbitration clause.52 
The USSC continued on its new course in AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, holding that 
the FAA pre-empted state law precluding class arbitration waivers.53 The question before the court 
was whether §2 of the FAA pre-empted California’s law “classifying most collective-arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable” (the Discover Bank rule).54 It analysed the effect 
of the ‘saving clause’ in §2, which limits the validity and enforceability of an arbitration agreement 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”.55 It found that 
no intent to preserve conflicting state-law rules standing as obstacles to the FAA’s objectives.56 
Invoking its reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen, it concluded that class arbitration, to the extent that it was 
enabled by Discover Bank rather than through contractual agreement, was inconsistent with the 
FAA.57 Because it was “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress”, the rule was pre-empted by the FAA.58 The opinion invalidated 
the Discover Bank ruling that the FAA did not pre-empt the doctrine of unconscionability and 
consequently that class action waivers in consumer adhesion contracts were unenforceable. It has 
been argued that Concepcion does not say how to deal with situations when a claimant can prove 
factually that a class action waiver in an arbitration clause precludes the vindication of his or her 
rights.59 This was precisely the reason for invoking the unconscionability doctrine in Discover 
Bank, although it was not followed by a deep examination of the facts pertaining to plaintiff’s 
options. It exceeds the scope of this article to examine the applicability issue in detail. Suffice it to 
end here with the reservation that a different outcome might be reached by new forms of contract 
interpretation and pre-emption.
48 Ibid at 9.
49 Ibid. The court expressed some doubts about the understanding of the Bazzle case. It argued that the opinion in 
that case was formed only by plurality, and therefore could not be taken as law. There was no need to address the 
question of who should rule on the availability of class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen, because the parties agreed to 
assign that issue to the arbitrators (ibid at 15-16).
50 Ibid at 20 (emphasis in the original).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid at 21.
53 AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion et ux (2011) 563 US 333 [Concepcion].
54 Ibid at 5.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid at 9.
57 Ibid at 13.
58 Ibid at 18.
59 Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, “After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion” 
(2012) 79 Univ Chicago L Rev 623 at 628 [Gilles & Friedman].
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The USSC relied heavily on its understanding of the ‘nature’ or ‘fundamental principles’ of 
arbitration in both Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, referring to the FAA definition and not a doctrinal 
one. The problem is that the FAA does not contain a clear definition either, which led justices to 
make their own determinations. It has been argued accordingly that different understandings of 
arbitration may have affected the consistency of their opinions.60 The Concepcion majority has 
been particularly criticized for abandoning the prevailing 20th century idea of arbitration in the 
US and offering protection only to the type of arbitration prevalent at the time of the FAA’s 
adoption: “informal, small-stakes, bipartite proceedings”.61 However, it is submitted here that the 
definition of arbitration is likely an inappropriate criterion for determining the availability of class 
arbitration. That arbitration is a matter of consent is indisputable. Instead of debating arbitration’s 
essence then, a more productive question might be what is required for arbitration to proceed. B. Consent to Class Actions in US Domestic Law
The issue of consent to class litigation is governed by statute and arises when determining 
who is treated as a class member bound by a decision. Until 1966, only those who opted in were 
treated as members. After that, the mechanism was reversed so that everyone who did not opt 
out was considered to have joined.62 Crucially, members are to receive a notice stating they need 
not take any action if they agree to be part of the class, while still giving them an opportunity to 
opt out if they wish.63 If they do not, their consent is considered obtained. This heavy reliance 
on the consent of absent class members could be problematic because of issues with opt out 
opportunities64 and has led to arguments for reintroducing an opt-in mechanism.65 Consent is an 
issue because plaintiffs are still parties to the process. There is concern over whether they should 
be bound in this way by a decision that implicates awarded rights but also prospectively imposes 
obligations. 
The stakes are different in class arbitration, where the issue of the existence of consent is 
more apparent. The primary question is whether special or ‘secondary’ consent by the respondent 
is present.66 Arbitrators can order class or multiparty arbitration on the basis of either expressed 
or implied secondary consent.67 In Stolt-Nielsen, the court ruled that consent to class arbitration 
60 SI Strong, “Does Class Arbitration ‘Change the Nature’ of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First 
Principles” (2012) 17 Harvard Negotiation L Rev 201 at 228 [Strong, “Nature”].
61 Born & Salas, supra note 41 at 22.
62 See above Part III, Section A.
63 Hanotiau, supra note 12 at 262. Such notices are usually addressed individually to class members, but also other 
means can be used, such as publications, radio or television; see further ibid at 261-262.
64 For the same concern in the context of class processes and personal jurisdiction see Debra Lyn Bassett, “Implied 
‘Consent’ to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Litigation” (2004) 2004 Michigan State L Rev 619 at 
628 ff.
65 Ibid at 637-641; Hensler, supra note 38 at 476-477.
66 The issue of opting out of course appears also in the context of class arbitration. However, the attention here will 
be given primarily to the issue of “secondary consent” of the respondent. In that respect, “secondary consent” 
refers to consent to class (or mass claims) arbitration in particular, which might already be provided or come 
subsequently. Consent of the claimants initiating the arbitration is not an issue, because, should the requested 
arbitration amount to an alteration of the agreement to arbitrate, the initiation itself is considered a counteroffer 
triggering the issue of “secondary consent” of the respondent. See Steingruber, Consent, supra note 26 at 75.
67 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 252.
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must be provided. The main question before the arbitrators should therefore not be whether 
the arbitration clause prohibits class arbitration, but whether it allows it. Strong argues that the 
case therefore “contemplates the same kind of interpretive analysis that has always been used to 
determine the existence of secondary consent in multiparty scenarios”.68 She argues that the USSC 
“merely appears to be reinforcing the need to establish secondary consent”.69 But she also rebutted 
the court’s proposition about the changed nature of class arbitration,70 ultimately attempting to 
characterize the court’s approach as too restrictive. This article seeks to shift the focus of the 
debate from the issue of the ‘nature’ of arbitration towards the issue of consent to procedure. 
The question of party consent to class arbitration should be reformulated in terms of whether the 
parties have consented to a procedure permitting class arbitration. 
Party consent to class arbitration can be determined by the arbitration agreement itself or 
the chosen arbitration rules.71 Looking to the agreement is problematic because it is usually silent 
on the issue.72 A choice of rules however, if present, represents the procedure consented to by the 
parties and a starting point for further procedural determinations.73 Since arbitral rules are normally 
incorporated in arbitration agreements by reference, much depends on the content of the rules 
drafted by arbitral institutions.74 Following Bazzle, the question that should be addressed is “what 
kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to”, which concerns contract interpretation and 
arbitral procedures.75 The adjudicator should use a three-step test, determining first the applicable 
procedure chosen by the parties, secondly whether that procedure allows for class arbitration, and 
finally whether the parties excluded the possibility of class arbitration altogether by modifying 
the chosen rules and limiting their scope of application.76 Class arbitration can proceed only if the 
answers to the second and third question are ‘yes’ and ‘no’ respectively. 
68 Ibid at 253.
69 Ibid at 254.
70 See ibid in general.
71 SI Strong, “The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards When 
Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?” (2009) 30 Michigan J Int’l L 1017 
at 1061-1062 [Strong, “Silence”]. See also ibid at 1064-1065 (arguing that “[a]lthough the primary emphasis is 
of course on procedural law, some attention must also be paid to any relevant substantive law, in case it contains 
provisions that can explicitly or implicitly be said to permit or require class or group proceedings”).
72 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 221.
73 Strong, “Silence”, supra note 71 at 1072 (“[…] an arbitrator who is asked to decide whether an arbitration 
agreement supports class treatment must consider the provisions contained in any arbitral rules that have been 
adopted by the parties”).
74 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 206 (arguing that “it was not until 2003, when the United States Supreme 
Court gave its implicit approval to the procedure in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, that various U.S.-
based arbitral institutions promulgated their specialized rules on class arbitration” [references omitted]). See also 
Strong, “Silence”, supra note 71 at 1025-1026 (where, before the Stolt-Nielsen ruling, Strong argued that “[n]ot 
only has the procedure been standardized to some extent through the creation of several sets of specialized arbitral 
rules, but the balance between judicial and arbitral authority has been stabilized after an initial period of confusion 
and contradiction” [reference omitted]).
75 Bazzle, supra note 43 at 452-453. See also Strong, “Silence”, supra note 71 at 1056 (arguing that a similar 
question regarding implied consent appears in consolidation cases).
76 Following the recent practice of the appellate courts for the Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuit (see note 43 above), 
it should be said that the final resolution of the issue who is authorized to rule on availability of class arbitration 
is to be seen in the future, given the differences between that practice and the one of the USSC in Bazzle and (at 
least to some extent) in Stolt-Nielsen. 
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Applicable procedure has also been discussed within the context of the New York 
Convention.77 Under that Convention, an arbitral award should be enforceable if the procedure 
applied by the arbitrators is in conformity with that chosen by the parties or the governing law. 
This is arguably so even with minor deviations.78 Nevertheless, a finding of implied consent to 
class arbitration must be reasonable and grounded clear interpretative methods.79 Concluding that 
the parties consented to class arbitration via the incorporation of arbitration rules allowing for 
such a process has to be accompanied by clear reasons. A mere mentioning that the parties did not 
exclude class arbitration would not suffice.
Class arbitration waivers have been developed as a method of denying consent to class 
arbitration, a practice considered unfriendly towards claimants. This has raised questions about 
whether they can be invalidated in favour of establishing consent.80 One argument advances that 
waivers demonstrate the awareness of the possibility of class actions at the time of drafting by all 
parties because otherwise they would be unnecessary.81 Another point is that arbitrators should not 
be able to establish parties’ consent to class arbitration by invalidating class action waivers because 
this would be an issue of clause validity—not merely contractual interpretation—and therefore for 
the courts to decide.82 Nevertheless, any possibility of invalidating class action waivers has been 
significantly reduced by the Concepcion ruling.
A few words should also be said about policy considerations. Class arbitration is considered 
one of the most efficient ways of protecting rights and enforcing small claims of a large number 
of holders.83 Along with representative relief, Strong regards this as a distinguishing feature 
of class arbitration.84 But though class arbitration does offer efficiency advantages, arbitrators 
cannot impose a special procedure to save resources or time. This would be inconsistent with the 
arbitration agreement reflecting the parties’ intentions,85 violating the primacy of consent. Class 
arbitration should be considered the same as regular arbitration in the sense that it requires all 
aspects to be consented to by the parties. Arbitrators have no power to alter that agreement to form 
a class.86
77 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 UNTS 38 (entered 
into force 7 June 1959).
78 Strong, “Silence”, supra note 71 at 1029 (arguing that allowing class process in case of silent arbitration agreement 
would not amount to a material breach of that agreement).
79 Ibid at 1085.
80 Apparently, challenges of class action waivers came in two waves. The first one challenged such waivers as 
unconscionable when contained in consumer adhesion contracts (this was reflected in the Discover Bank case), 
while the second wave challenged such waivers on the ground that their “implicit prohibition against spreading 
the costs of litigation across multiple claimants in collective litigation precludes the individual plaintiff from 
being able to vindicate her federal statutory rights”. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 59 at 632-633.
81 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 229.
82 Hanotiau, supra note 12 at 273-274. For the question whether this is an issue for courts or arbitrators to decide see 
the Bazzle case discussed in Part III, Section A above.
83 See, for example, Strong, “Silence”, supra note 71 at 1048 (even arguing that “the benefits of efficiency in class 
arbitration extend not only to parties who are actively involved in the proceeding—i.e., the defendant(s) and 
named claimants—but also to scores of others, including both the unnamed claimants and, arguably, society as a 
whole”). Indeed, the Abaclat tribunal made the same observation; see note 11 above.
84 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 241.
85 Ibid at 237.
86 The USSC commenced its opinion in another case in 2013 by affirming its position in Stolt-Nielsen and stating: 
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In sum, special consent to class processes remains crucial. Within the context of class 
litigation, statute considers abstention from opting out to indicate consent. In class arbitration, 
consent is achieved through the agreement to arbitrate. Secondary consent must be present via 
an agreement to class arbitration in particular and not simply to ‘an arbitration’ in general. This 
can be implied by the agreement, but not constructed through extensive interpretation by virtue 
of arbitrators’ views regarding the best solution. Implied consent must be found on the basis of 
factors that are consensual in nature such as those agreed upon and forming or governing the 
agreement to arbitrate (like the choice of particular arbitral rules).87
IV. What’s	Wrong	with	Abaclat?
This part critically examines the Abaclat decision and discusses the availability of mass 
claims in investment treaty arbitration. It pays particular attention to the need for a secondary 
consent to mass claims arbitration (Section A), as well as the relief pursued and used in such an 
arbitration (Section B).A. The Need for a Secondary Consent to Mass Claims Investment Arbitration
Two questions surround secondary consent to mass claims arbitration: whether its 
availability should be discussed as a problem of admissibility or consent, and how ‘silence’ in the 
applicable procedural rules on collective proceedings should be treated. 1. Admissibility or Consent?
Mass claims in investment arbitration have two important features: the causal (large num-
bers of claimants) and the consequential (procedural adaptations). The Abaclat majority decision 
focused on the former,88 and avoided consent issues by arguing that where the BIT qualified trans-
“Class arbitration is a matter of consent: An arbitrator may employ class procedures only if the parties have 
authorized them”. Oxford Health Plans LLC v John Ivan Sutter (2013) 569 US at 1.
87 In addition, arbitrators have to verify the satisfaction of other important criteria. Thus, the American Arbitration 
Association Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations provide in Rule 4(a): “If the arbitrator is satisfied that 
the arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed as a class arbitration, as provided in Rule 3, or where a 
court has ordered that an arbitrator determine whether a class arbitration may be maintained, the arbitrator shall 
determine whether the arbitration should proceed as a class arbitration. For that purpose, the arbitrator shall 
consider the criteria enumerated in this Rule 4 and any law or agreement of the parties the arbitrator determines 
applies to the arbitration. In doing so, the arbitrator shall determine whether one or more members of a class 
may act in the arbitration as representative parties on behalf of all members of the class described. The arbitrator 
shall permit a representative to do so only if each of the following conditions is met: (1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; 
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (6) 
each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause which is substantially similar 
to that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other class members.” See American Arbitration 
Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (effective 8 October 2003), online: <https://www.adr.
org/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitrations.pdf>.
88 The tribunal, however, stated that “[r]epresentative proceedings raise issues relating to consent, especially for 
those who subscribe to a view of arbitration that requires the parties’ explicit consent not only to arbitration of the 
dispute but also to the procedure to be used in the arbitration”, and that “[t]he only remaining question is whether a 
specific consent regarding the specific conditions in which the present arbitration would be conducted is required, 
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actions at stake as investments (which were already likely to involve a large number of claimants), 
it would be contrary to the spirit of the BIT and the ICSID Convention to require additional con-
sent by the responding State to collective actions and denying investors effective protection.89 The 
question was therefore whether the process could be conducted within the ICSID framework sub-
ject to procedural modifications, and not whether the respondent State consented to mass claims 
arbitration.90 For the tribunal, the ‘mass’ aspect of the proceedings (a large number of investors) 
was a question of “modalities and implementation of the ICSID proceedings”, not consent; it was 
a question of admissibility, not jurisdiction.91
This approach was subsequently criticized in Alemanni. According to the latter tribunal, 
the Abaclat majority presupposed that having jurisdiction over each individual automatically en-
tailed jurisdiction over a multi-claimant proceeding.92 It created its own test to distinguish be-
tween jurisdiction and admissibility related issues, differentiating between objections to party 
consent to ICSID arbitration and those that questioned whether, even if parties consented, there 
were reasons the tribunal should decline hearing the dispute “in the form in which the dispute is 
brought before it”.93 The tribunal still discussed prospective procedural changes as an issue of ad-
missibility,94 probably due to its opinion that the main jurisdictional notion in a case with multiple 
claimants should be a common dispute against the responding State.95 Matters of consent were to 
be regarded narrowly, as related only to substance (the dispute itself) and not “the form in which 
the dispute is brought before it”. By contrast, the dissent in Abaclat opined that
jurisdiction is first and foremost a power, the legal power to exercise the judicial 
or arbitral function. Any limits to this power, whether inherent or consensual, i.e. 
stipulated in the jurisdictional title (consent within certain limits, or subject to 
reservations or conditions relating to the powers of the organ) are jurisdictional 
by essence. They are no less jurisdictional, in fact more so, than the limits relating 
to one of the four dimensions of the ambit within which jurisdiction is exercised 
[...].96
The dissent’s approach is consistent with the practice of the International Court of Justice 
(‘ICJ’) and other investment tribunals. Investment arbitration operates within, and is governed by, 
public international law. ICJ practice is instructive regarding what the Abaclat majority referred 
i.e., regarding the form of collective proceedings”; Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at paras 485 and 489 (emphasis 
added). 
89 Ibid at para 490.
90 Ibid at para 491.
91 Ibid at para 492. For a critique of the tribunal’s distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, see also Anna 
de Luca, “Collective Actions in ICSID Arbitration: The Argentine Bonds Case” (2011) 21 Italian Yrbk Int’l L 211 
at 226-239 [De Luca].
92 Alemanni, supra note 23 at para 289.
93 Ibid at para 260.
94 Ibid at paras 321-325.
95 Ibid at para 292 (this led the tribunal to join the final ruling on jurisdiction to the merits phase of the case). 
96 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab (28 October 2011), ICSID, 
Case No ARB/07/5 at para 126 [Abaclat Dissenting Opinion].
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to as “implementation of consent”.97 In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ 
notes that “jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties and is confined to the extent accepted 
by them”, and “[w]hen that consent is expressed in a compromissory clause in an international 
agreement, any conditions to which such consent is subject must be regarded as constituting the 
limits thereon”.98 The same applies to consent to arbitration under public international law: specif-
ic wording in a compromissory clause specifying which procedure the parties are consenting to is 
nothing but a matter of consent. 
The Abaclat majority’s approach is also inconsistent with ICSID case law. In the SGS v 
Philippines, the tribunal ruled that issues of jurisdiction were governed by the relevant BIT and 
the ICSID Convention, whereas issues of admissibility concerned impediments precluding the 
claim.99 The two main features of inadmissibility are therefore said to be the impediment to bring a 
claim and prematurity of the claim.100 Two criteria have been suggested for delimiting jurisdiction 
from admissibility: if a claim cannot be brought before the seized forum, then the issue concerns 
jurisdiction; but if a claim can be brought but could not be heard at all or not at the particular mo-
ment, the issue concerns admissibility.101 While it may be problematic to assign the question of 
applicable procedure to either category, forum seems more appropriate because the forum seized 
can only apply one procedure in a particular case, and that procedure is defined together with the 
forum itself. While ‘jurisdiction’ might not be the most appropriate label, the issue of consent to 
applicable procedure is ultimately what matters. 
Qualifying the issue of applicable procedure as a matter of consent also concerns the fun-
damentals of arbitration. These apply in class arbitration where tribunals are given the freedom to 
award different relief than is available in ‘regular’ arbitration. Such freedom can only be triggered 
once it is clear the parties have consented to an arbitral procedure allowing for class arbitration.102 
Class arbitration is available only if the parties have agreed to it and the agreement does not con-
tain specific wording precluding it.103 The agreement should not be understood formalistically as 
consent to class arbitration can also be inferred from other circumstances,104 and this should also 
be the case in public international law.105 Most important is that reasons for the existence of con-
97 In other parts of the decision, the Abaclat majority referred to the issues of admissibility as issues of “implementation 
of consent”. See Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at paras 493-496.
98 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, [2006] ICJ Rep 6 at para 88 (the court continued in the 
same paragraph by invoking its previous practice and concluding that it “considers that the examination of such 
conditions [of consent] relates to its jurisdiction and not to the admissibility of the application”).
99 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction (29 January 2004), ICSID, Case No ARB/02/6 at para 154.
100 Jan Paulsson, “Jurisdiction and Admissibility” in Gerald Aksen et al, eds, Global Reflections on International 
Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner (Paris: International 
Chamber of Commerce, 2005) 601 at 606-607.
101 Ibid at 617. Further on the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, see also Veijo Heiskanen, “Ménage 
à trois? Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Competence in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2014) 29 ICSID Rev-FILJ 
231. 
102 For the interdependence between representative relief and the applicable procedure see Part IV, Section B.
103 See Part III, Section A.
104 See Part III, Section A (in respect to the Stolt-Nielsen ruling) and Section B. 
105 Public international law follows the same approach in the construction of arbitration agreements. The ICJ has 
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sent must be given because a mere absence of an exclusion of class or mass arbitration does not 
suffice. If that is so for class arbitration, a fortiori it must be the same for a hybrid process. 
The Abaclat dispute was subject to Article 8 of the Argentina-Italy BIT, which stipulates 
that arbitral disputes are subject to ICSID Convention.106 The arbitration rules within that frame-
work, the ICSID-AR, are the applicable procedure.107 It has been argued that procedural issues are 
separate from State consent because they fall under Article 44 of the ICSID Convention, not under 
those provisions regulating the jurisdiction. According to this argument, the issue of State consent 
for arbitrating a particular dispute is different from whether that can be done in accordance with 
the existing rules—the latter issue concerning admissibility.108 This reasoning, however, is incon-
sistent with Article 44, which provides that the arbitration proceeding will be conducted “in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance 
with the Arbitration Rules [i.e. ICSID-AR] in effect on the date on which the parties consented to 
arbitration”.109 The choice of the applicable rules is accordingly governed exclusively by the par-
ties’ agreement. A reference to the ICSID Convention in the relevant BIT amounts to consenting 
to that Convention and the ICSID-AR as the applicable procedural rules. 
In short, the Abaclat majority erred in law by holding that the ‘mass aspect’ qualification 
fell under admissibility. It associated mass aspect with the mere number of the claimants and did 
not give due attention to consequential considerations. It disregarded the practice of international 
forums in omitting to identify all the matters covered by the consent to arbitrate. Instead, it gave 
significant weight to the silence of the ICSID procedural rules on mass claims procedures and the 
tribunal’s power to adapt accordingly. As the following section argues, this amounts to a departure 
from the agreement and violates the consensual nature of arbitration.
repeated numerous times that its jurisdiction is limited to the extent of the parties’ consent, but it has also referred 
to the possibility of consent by implication; see Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), Preliminary Question, 
[1954] ICJ Rep 19 at 32; and Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
Albania), Preliminary Objection, [1948] ICJ Rep 15 at 26-29 (where the ICJ inferred Albania’s consent to its 
jurisdiction).
106 An unofficial English translation of the Argentina-Italy BIT is available in Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 
270 (“[…] 3. If, after 18 months from the notification of commencement of an action before the national courts 
indicated in the above paragraph 2, the dispute between the Contracting Party and the investors still continues to 
exist, it may be subject to international arbitration. With this purpose and under this Agreement, each Contracting 
Party grants its anticipated and irrevocable consent that any dispute may be subject to arbitration. [...] 5. In 
case of international arbitration, the dispute will be subject, upon choice of the investor, to one of the following 
arbitration bodies: a) International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (I.C.S.I.D.), established under 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States opened 
for signature in Washington on March 18, 1965, provided that both Contracting Parties are parties to the said 
Convention. If this condition is not satisfied, each of the Contracting Parties agrees that the dispute shall be subject 
to arbitration in compliance with the Additional Facility Rules for conciliation and arbitration of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.” [emphasis added]).
107 This clearly stems from Article 44 ICSID Convention, which provides that an arbitration under the ICSID 
auspices will be conducted in accordance with the ICSID-AR, except if the parties agree otherwise. For this 
reason Dolzer and Schreuer characterize the ICSID system as “self-contained and denationalized”. See Dolzer & 
Schreuer, supra note 28 at 278.
108 Demirkol, supra note 14 at 619.
109 ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art 44.
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2. Silence in the ICSID Convention and Procedural Adaptations
The confusion about procedural adaptations and consent lies in the second part of Article 44 
of the ICSID Convention. The article provides that “[i]f any question of procedure arises which is 
not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the tribunal 
shall decide the question”.110 The Abaclat majority relied on this to adapt the arbitration rules for 
mass claims procedures, considering the ICSID Convention’s silence on collective procedures 
as a gap to be filled, rather than a ‘qualified silence’ implying that collective procedures not be 
allowed by being intentionally left out.111 Relying on Article 44 in conjunction with Rule 19 of 
the ICSID-AR, it held that it had the power to fill the gaps without modifying the ICSID-AR or 
adopting new sets of rules.112 The two determinations allowed it to conclude that the procedural 
adaptations necessary to deal with claimants’ claims in a collective way were admissible.113 It 
cited its power to resolve procedural questions in the event of lacunae,114 which was subsequently 
described in scholarship as the inherent power of the tribunal to make the necessary adaptations.115 
The problem with the majority’s reasoning is its confusion of these two ‘inherent powers’. 
Although it emphasized it did not have the power to modify or adopt, it effectively concluded 
that it could adapt entire sets of rules. Article 44 provides that a tribunal can resolve a question 
of procedure if that question is not covered by the ICSID Convention, ICSID-AR, or any other 
applicable rules the parties agreed to. But as the dissenting opinion points out, Article 44 refers 
to the situations where no rule exists, while the majority’s reasoning is aimed at adapting existing 
rules because they did not fit within a mass claims process.116 Therefore, Article 44 cannot serve 
as the basis for adaptation of the rules of procedure. Furthermore, while Rule 19 provides that 
the tribunal will make orders for the conduct of the proceedings,117 the Notes to ICSID-AR 
state that procedural orders must be based on either the ICSID Convention itself, the ICSID-
AR, other applicable rules if the parties have agreed so, or, if none of these rules contain the 
necessary provision, a decision reached by the tribunal itself.118 To base a procedural order on an 
adapted provision of the ICSID Convention, or on an adapted rule of the ICSID-AR is therefore 
problematic. 
Finally, the modifications themselves need to be considered. The tribunal held that 
adaptations concerned examinations of the claims and representation of the claimants,119 as well 
110 Ibid.
111 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 520.
112 Ibid at paras 521-524. See also para 525, where the tribunal attempted to make a clarification by saying that 
it “can and ought to fill gaps left where the application of existing rules are not adapted to the specific dispute 
submitted to ICSID arbitration”, and that “[i]n such a case, the filling of the gap does not consist of an amendment 
of the written rule itself, but rather of an adaptation of its application in a specific case”.
113 Ibid at para 547.
114 Ibid at para 521.
115 Demirkol, supra note 14 at 635.
116 Abaclat Dissenting Opinion, supra note 96 at para 201.
117 ICSID-AR, supra note 3, rule 19.
118 ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) (1986) 4 Int’l Tax & Business Lawyer 
362 at 381, Rule 19, Note A (emphasis added). Notes are available with the previous version of the ICSID-AR, 
but Rule 19 remained unchanged.
119 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 530.
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as creating “a simplified verification of evidentiary material”.120 Furthermore, it created a unique 
mechanism for evaluating jurisdiction and admissibility of each individual claim.121 The tribunal 
adjusted entire sets of existing rules governing whole aspects of procedure. That procedure had 
to be made by the tribunal was not surprising because of the silence of existing procedure on 
large-scale processes.122 However, in finding that filling gaps could entail modifying entire sets of 
existing rules, the majority misinterpreted the wording of the ICSID Convention and ICSID-AR. 
Applicable procedure still fell under the exclusive competence of the parties’ agreement. Tribunals 
render orders determining the conduct of proceedings based on procedural rules consented to by 
the parties, whereas the Abaclat majority aimed at establishing entire new sets of rules in place of 
ones already consented to. The notion that filling gaps in this way does not amend the written rule 
itself but rather adapts its application in a specific case123 is problematic because it violates the 
consensual nature of arbitration. B. The Relief: Adapted versus Consented Procedure
The use of class-like relief in a mass claims proceeding marks a major departure from 
standard ICSID procedure. This section discusses this change within the context of the arbitral 
discretion to use representative relief and the compliance of such a relief with existing investment 
arbitration practices.1.  Do Arbitrators Enjoy the Discretion to Use Representative Relief?
Representative relief is a distinctive feature of class processes, awarding remedies to 
members of the class who do not take part in the proceedings.124 Classes are certified to determine 
liability in a class action process, while damages are sometimes left for later determination in a 
small or administrative process.125 Representative relief appears as an abstraction while concrete 
claims are finally settled separately. 
The USSC has arguably never challenged the use of representative relief in arbitration, 
perhaps even approving the device implicitly.126 In Concepcion however, the court found that the 
FAA did not signal congressional intent to leave the disposition of procedural requirements for 
a class process to an arbitrator.127 The court indicated a clear connection between the procedural 
formality of class arbitration and the binding force of the decision.128 Thus, class arbitration is 
120 Ibid at para 531.
121 See Part IV, Section B, Subsection 2.
122 Strong, Class, supra note 4 at 75.
123 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 525.
124 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 213-214.
125 Hanotiau, supra note 12 at 262-263.
126 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 214-215.
127 Concepcion, supra note 53 at 15.
128 Ibid (“[…] [C]lass arbitration requires procedural formality. The AAA’s rules governing class arbitrations mimic 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class litigation. […] And while parties can alter those procedures by 
contract, an alternative is not obvious. If procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be bound 
by the arbitration. For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class representatives must at 
all times adequately represent absent class members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity 
to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class. […] At least this amount of process would presumably be required 
for absent parties to be bound by the results of arbitration.”).
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permissible only when the applicable class action procedure is clearly consented to. If the chosen 
rules provide for a class arbitration with its formalities there is no obstacle to its conduction and 
its ultimate binding effect on the parties. The USSC therefore links procedure with the possibility 
of awarding a class relief.
Strong has argued that representative relief complies with arbitration’s adjudicatory 
feature because it passes the test as a neutral procedure that observes the parties’ right to be 
heard and resolves the dispute in “an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner”.129 That test needs 
to be redefined in more concrete terms, however, because there is no general definition of 
arbitration130 that entails specific procedural standards.131 Parties do not consent to arbitration in 
abstracto. Rather, they must specify its elements in concreto: is it ad hoc or institutionalized? 
What is the applicable procedure? What is the place of arbitration? etc. When the parties have 
chosen a particular procedure, any variation represents a change to what has been agreed upon—
changing the definition of the arbitration in concreto.132 The question is therefore whether the use 
of a representative relief complies with the definition of arbitration in concreto, and particularly 
whether it complies with the chosen procedure. In class arbitration, representative relief must stem 
from a representative process. If the agreement to arbitrate does not allow for a class process then 
the outcome of the process cannot be representative relief. A fortiori, this must also be the case in 
a hybrid arbitration.2.  Is Representative Relief Compatible with the Investment Arbitration System?
Abaclat is the only mass claims investment arbitration conducted so far and was not a class 
proceeding because it had clearly identified claimants with individual claims. But it did contain 
a representative feature linked to the procedure applied by the tribunal (which is why it was 
qualified as a hybrid).133 However, the conduct of that arbitration demonstrates that the tribunal 
did use a sort of representative relief. The tribunal limited itself to a general test on jurisdiction and 
admissibility while factual findings regarding each claimant (which were supposed to be applied 
to that test) were to be made by an expert. The operative part of the award referred to general 
tests (using the phrase ‘to the extent’) on the admissibility of the claims,134 as well as jurisdiction 
129 Strong, “Nature”, supra note 60 at 266 (references to Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 217 and 253).
130 Ibid at 242 ff (however, at 243-244 Strong does find helpful Born’s approach in defining arbitration by concentrating 
on the notion of adjudication, as “it appears to describe a definitional requirement, meaning a quality that must 
exist for a particular process to be considered ‘arbitration’”).
131 Ibid at 244 (stating that “despite the centrality of adjudication to the arbitral process, no consensus appears to 
exist as to what the adjudicatory process must entail” and that “a wide variety of procedures have been deemed 
permissible”; however, Strong further notes that not “every possible type of adjudicatory procedure is permitted”, 
that “[c]ertain minimal standards of due process or procedural fairness must be met if the so-called arbitration is 
to withstand judicial scrutiny”, but that “the question of whether a particular process is adjudicatory is slightly 
different from the question of whether the same process is fair” [references omitted]).
132 As for the notion of variation, tribunals do have the power to conduct the proceedings before them and to issue 
orders for such purposes. In that sense, “a variation” refers only to situations where a tribunal finds a particular, 
existing rule of procedure inappropriate, and decides to substitute it with a new one. See the discussion on the 
power of the tribunal to adapt the applicable procedure in Part IV, Section A, Subsection 2.
133 See Part II, Section A.
134 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 713(1)(i) Issue 1(b).
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rationae personae over both natural135 and juridical persons.136 The verification of claimants’ 
database “against the requirements” set forth in the jurisdictional decision was to be done by an 
expert appointed by the tribunal, culminating in an expert report.137 The expert’s mandate was 
clarified to be purely factual, ignoring legal issues and focusing on “determining which factual 
conclusions can be drawn from the information and documents contained in the Database”.138 The 
tribunal noted that the verification process should help identify inconsistencies and irregularities 
in the information and documents, but that it remained the tribunal’s task “to determine how to 
deal with such inconsistencies and irregularities, if any”, and that the verification process was only 
a starting point for the tribunal to decide “to what extent an individualised review of claims or 
documents w[ould] be necessary and how to best address such review”.139
There are two problems with this approach. First, the tribunal was not consistent on the 
particulars of the expert’s mandate. While Procedural Order 12 required that the verification of 
claimants’ database be done against the requirements set forth in the jurisdictional decision, Order 
15 stated that the expert was to ignore legal considerations and consequences and approach issues 
from a factual perspective. Second, the tribunal adopted a narrow understanding of its adjudicative 
power. This would normally include factual and legal findings,140 with the former involving the 
assessment of evidence including expert reports.141 By mandating that the expert make definitive 
factual findings, the tribunal delegated a part of its own powers.142 The Abaclat ruling therefore 
135 Ibid at para 713(1)(x).
136 Ibid at para 713(1)(xi). For a critique of the tribunal’s abstract approach to the ruling on jurisdiction see also de 
Luca, supra note 91.
137 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, Procedural Order No 12 (7 July 2012), ICSID, Case No ARB/07/5 at para 4 of 
the dipositive.
138 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, Procedural Order No 15 (20 November 2012), ICSID, Case No ARB/07/5 at 
para 20.
139 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, Procedural Order No 17 (8 February 2013), ICSID, Case No ARB/07/5 at para 
21(ii).
140 The same applies to jurisdictional determinations: Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and 
Others v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 March 2010), ICSID, Case No ARB/08/8 at para 57 (“At the 
jurisdictional stage, the Tribunal must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to hear the merits of the dispute. This 
requires the Tribunal to make definitive findings of any facts that are directly determinative of its jurisdiction”). 
See also Christoph H Schreuer et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) at 641-642 (stating that “[d]uring the [ICSID] Convention’s drafting, it was also made 
clear that fact-finding is not an independent function of a tribunal but an indispensable task incidental to its judicial 
function”, and that failing to abide the applicable standards for taking and evaluation of evidence, governed both 
by the ICSID-AR and general principles of law, may risk annulment of the decision). See further ibid at 90 and 
103. 
141 Usually tribunals appoint experts in relation to the issues of quantum of damages. See Sergey Ripinsky & Kevin 
Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (London: British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2008) at 176 ff. On the difference between the roles of tribunal-appointed experts in assisting the tribunal 
in the valuation of the damages and the one assumed in Abaclat see Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration as Public International Law. Procedural Aspects and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) at 120-121. See also Panayotis M Protopsaltis, “The Role of Experts in ICSID and WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedures: Towards a New Paradigm?” (2014) 3 Developing World Rev on Trade and Competition 
1 at paras 12 and 26-28.
142 Another problem is that the tribunal did so despite an explicit disagreement between the parties: Abaclat and 
Others v Argentina, Dissenting Opinion to Procedural Order No 15 (20 November 2012), ICSID, Case No 
ARB/07/5 at paras 24-45.
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resembles representative relief because, like one would normally expect from a class action, the 
tribunal limited its ruling to a general test while the concrete assessment of the facts related to 
each claim was assigned to a third party.143 
This outcome could not have been anticipated by the parties. Both the ICSID Convention 
and the ICSID-AR stipulate that the tribunal must examine every question before it.144 Even the 
Abaclat majority acknowledged that it was obliged to examine “all relevant aspects of the claims 
relating to Claimants’ rights under the BIT as well as to Respondent’s obligations thereunder 
subject to the Parties’ submissions”.145 But examining of all questions must include making 
factual examinations and findings. No rule allowed the tribunal to confer that duty to a third 
party. The procedure required examination of each issue, but the tribunal denied that duty and 
came up with a new procedure which delegated a part of its adjudicating power to a third party.146 
Procedure and relief must be compliant, even in class arbitration.147 While it should be the case in 
a hybrid arbitration as well, this was not true for the Abaclat majority’s conception of mass claims 
investment arbitration. The relief and the manner of reaching it did not comply with the procedure 
agreed upon. The outcome of the mass claims arbitration is therefore inappropriate.
V. Conclusion:	Acting	Like	a	Court
In Stolt-Nielsen, the USSC noted that the tribunal in question acted like it had “the 
authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied” in 
the circumstances in ruling on the availability of class arbitration.148 The same can be said of 
tribunal in Abaclat. The majority allowed itself to adapt procedure by finding that it had the power 
to change pre-existing procedural rules and that such adaptations did not trigger the issues of 
consent. It built a new procedure while ignoring the fact that arbitration requires party approval 
of procedural adaptations. This approach to mass claims arbitration demonstrates an artificial 
understanding of what constitutes an adaptation, resulting in the undue modification of existing 
rules. It is a backdoor way to mass claims arbitration.
A debate between those favouring collective proceedings in similar cases, despite their 
ability to undermine some procedural safeguards, and those sticking firmly to traditional procedural 
limitations, exists in both domestic class and international mass claims investment arbitration 
fields. The difference is that there are no appellate courts to review the consistency of the cases 
such as Abaclat with the international legal norms. The Abaclat decision went beyond simply
143 See Hanotiau, supra note 12 at 262-263 (on the needs of individualized determinations after a generalized 
determination in a class process).
144 ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art 48(3) (providing that “[t]he award shall deal with every question submitted 
to the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon which it is based”). ICSID-AR, supra note 3, rule 47(1) (providing 
that “[t]he award shall be in writing and shall contain […] (i) the decision of the Tribunal on every question 
submitted to it, together with the reasons upon which the decision is based”).
145 Abaclat Decision, supra note 1 at para 551(iii). It can be noticed, though, that this wording of the majority might 
imply the examination of the legal arguments in the merits only.
146 Interestingly, Arbitrator Santiago Torres Bernárdez pointed to the tribunal’s failure to render its final award on 
the merits, even after finishing with all the phases of the adapted procedure. See Declaration by Santiago Torres 
Bernárdez, supra note 10 at para 13.
147 See Part IV, Section B, Subsection 1.
148 Stolt-Nielsen, supra note 46 at 9.
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enabling mass claims investment arbitration and initiated the development of a class process. 
The majority acted like a court developing policy, imposing its own view of what was needed in 
the proceedings and assuming the capacity to develop such a process for the future. The goal, it 
seems, was to create proceedings similar to a court class action: assuming its general availability, 
as well as using a ‘class-like’ relief limiting the tribunal’s purview to general tests, and assigning 
the assessment of individual claims to another body. The tribunal unfortunately failed to observe 
the inextricable link in all class actions between the disputing parties’ consent, representative 
procedure, and representative relief.
If this is a fair assessment of the decision, mass claims arbitration is still not a device 
available to investors in investment treaty arbitration. This article demonstrates that the approach 
taken in Abaclat did little to strengthen the case for mass claims in investment treaty arbitration. 
Stakeholders should therefore aim to develop a coherent set of specialized rules for collective 
proceedings available for adoption by States and investors. Abaclat only serves as a reminder that 
there is still much work to be done. 
